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CLOSING THE WILLFUL
INFRINGEMENT FLOODGATES:
THE EFFECTS OF INRE SEAGATE BOTH
INSIDE AND OUTSIDE THE GENERIC
PHARMACEUTICAL LITIGATION ARENA
By
John N. Maher &
Richard T. Ruzich'

I. INTRODUCTION

Proper resolution of the dilemma of an accused
infringer who must choose between the lawful
assertion of the attorney-client privilege and
avoidance of a willfulness finding if infringement is
found, is of great importance not only to the parties
but to the fundamental values sought to be
preserved by the attorney-client privilege. 2
In the above quote, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit (Federal Circuit) characterized the competing
interests involved where an accused patent infringer relies upon
the advice of counsel defense to combat an allegation of willful
infringement.
Compelled by the Federal Circuit to show "due care" to respect
presumptively valid patent rights, an accused infringer had to
secure an opinion from competent patent counsel on the issues of
1. Mssrs. Maher and Ruzich are partners in the intellectual property practice
group of Duane Morris LLP residing at the Chicago office. Mr. Maher is a

former United States Department of Justice trial attorney, serves as a major in
the Army JAG Corps Reserves, and teaches law as an adjunct faculty member.
Mr. Ruzich is a registered patent attorney, a former Justice Department trial
attorney, a Naval Intelligence Reservist, and an adjunct faculty member.
2. Quantum Corp. v. Tandon Corp., 940 F.2d 642, 643 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
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validity, infringement, or enforceability of the patent-in-issue.
However, to effectively utilize this opinion in litigation, the
accused infringer necessarily had to waive the attorney-client
privilege and decline the protections afforded by the work product
immunity doctrine in connection with that opinion.
These
draconian measures were taken to show the accused infringer's
good faith reliance on the advice of counsel to avoid a finding of
willfulness and resultant enhanced damages, as well as possible
attorney fees in those willfulness cases which the court deemed
exceptional under the Patent Act.
This judicially-crafted framework had its beginning shortly after
the creation of the Federal Circuit. Aimed at remedying the
missteps of "widespread disregard of patent rights," 3 the case law
beginning with Underwater Devices,4 and evolving through
Kloster Speedsteel,5 Knorr-Bremse,6 and EchoStar,7 created a
structure prompted by laudable intentions, but saddled the parties
with practical and costly challenges stemming from vitiating the
attorney-client privilege and work product doctrine. However, this
Federal Circuit structure became a Trojan horse of maladies,
embroiling the parties in costly, discovery-intensive litigation even
before the claims, the real heart of an infringement suit, were
construed.
The Federal Circuit recognized corrective action was needed and
that In re Seagate provided the platform to revise the willfulness
standard and limit the privilege and immunity waivers associated
with the advice of counsel defense. 8 In a significant reversal, the
patentee now has the burden of showing "objective recklessness"
to establish willful infringement. 9 The Federal Circuit further
3. Knorr-Bremse Systeme Fuer Nutzfahreuge GmbH v. Dana Corp., 383
F.3d 1337, 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (en banc) (citing ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON
INDUSTRIAL INNOVATION FINAL REPORT, DEP'T OF COMMERCE (1979)).

4. Underwater Devices, Inc. v. Morrison-Knudsen Co., 717 F.2d 1380 (Fed.
Cir. 1983).
5. Kloster Speedsteel AB v. Crucible Inc., 793 F.2d 1565 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
6. Knorr-Bremse, 383 F.3d 1337.
7. In re EchoStar Commc'ns Corp., 448 F.3d 1294 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (en
banc).

8. See In re Seagate Tech., LLC, 497 F.3d 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (en banc).
9. See infra notes 49-106 and accompanying text (discussing the evolution of
case law pertaining to willful infringement).
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol18/iss2/2
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raised the bar that a patentee must meet to show willfulness and
significantly narrowed the scope of waiver that a defendant risks
from relying on an opinion counsel to defeat a claim of
willfulness. '

Seagate also sounds a potential death knell to pleading naked
allegations of willful infringement in patent suits between brandname and generic drug companies in a Hatch-Waxman dispute.
The Hatch-Waxman procedures require a methodical, sequenced
progression of analysis and activity surrounding the patentee's
rights. " A generic company accused of willful infringement in
this setting can point to .the process itself, as well as other filings
required within the process, i.e., the notice letter, to show the
absence of "objective recklessness."
And, Seagate may provide a district court with the authority to
establish a bright line rule that willful infringement may not be
alleged in ANDA litigation, subject to amending the complaint
should discovery reveal disregard for the innovator company's
patent. Indeed, the Federal Circuit invited the district courts to
engage in this type of analysis when it stated, "[w]e leave it to
future cases to further develop the application of this standard."' 2
This article begins with a scenario in the general counsel's office
of a generic drug company navigating the ANDA process and
transitions to a brief overview of relevant patent law principles to
provide points of reference for the discussion of willful
infringement and waiver of the attorney-client privilege and
attorney work product immunity associated with the advice of
counsel defense which follows. The evolution of the Federal
Circuit's jurisprudence on the question of willful infringement and
privilege waiver is examined.
Seagate is briefed with particular attention to the new "objective
recklessness" standard and the attendant issues involving the
attorney-client privilege and attorney work product immunity.
With these principles established, discussion proceeds to the
relevant portions of Hatch-Waxman and Seagate's impact in the
10. See Seagate, 497 F.3d 1360.
11. See Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984,
Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585 (codified as amended 21 U.S.C. § 355
(2006)).
12. Seagate,497 F.3d at 1371.
Published by Via Sapientiae, 2016
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ANDA setting, demonstrating that innovator plaintiffs will likely
be unable to survive a generic company's motion to strike any
"naked" allegation of willfulness, motion for judgment on the
pleadings, motion to dismiss, or motion for summary judgment as
to willful infringement given the higher standard of "objective
recklessness" when applied to the ANDA process and its required
filings. 13
II. A HYPOTHETICAL EXAMPLE SHOWING THAT THE ANDA
PROCESS, BY ITS STATUTORY CONSTRUCT, CONTEMPLATES THE
ABSENCE OF "OBJECTIVE RECKLESSNESS" AND PUTS AN END TO
NAKED ALLEGATIONS OF WILLFUL INFRINGEMENT BETWEEN
INNOVATORS AND GENERIC PHARMACEUTICAL COMPANIES IN
LIGHT OF IN RE SEAGATE
As counsel for a generic pharmaceutical company, your business

model envisions identifying innovator drugs already approved by
the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) which are being sold in
the United States, developing the bioequivalent of that drug, and
seeking entry into the market through the procedures commonly
referred to as "Hatch-Waxman." 4
In this instance, you have already reviewed the "Orange Book"'5
13. See, e.g., Aventis Pharma Deutschland GMBH v. Cobalt Pharms., Inc.,
355 F. Supp. 2d 586, 592 (D. Mass. 2005) (granting defendant's motion for
judgment on the pleadings on plaintiffs willful infringement claim).
14. The Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984,
Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585 (codified at scattered sections of Titles 21, 35,
and 42 of the United States Code) (commonly referred to as "the HatchWaxman Act").
15. Formally known as the Approved Drugs With Therapeutic Equivalence
Evaluations, the compilation is commonly referred to as the "Orange Book"; see
also 21 U.S.C. § 355(b)(1) (2006) (requiring NDA filers to submit "the patent
number and the expiration date of any patent which claims the drug for which
the applicant submitted the application or which claims a method of using such
drug and with respect to which a claim of patent infringement could reasonably
be asserted if a person not licensed by the owner engaged in the manufacture,
use, or sale of the drug"); Applications for FDA Approval to Market a New
Drug: Patent Submission and Listing Requirements and Application of 30Month Stays on Approval of Abbreviated New Drug Applications Certifying
That a Patent Claiming a Drug Is Invalid or Will Not Be Infringed, 68 Fed. Reg.
36,676 (June 18, 2003).
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol18/iss2/2
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containing information on FDA approved drugs and identified the
target. You retain outside patent counsel to review the patent
covering the drug and to provide you with a written opinion
discussing the validity, infringement, or enforceability of the
patent. Upon review of outside counsel's opinion, you learn that
two pieces of prior art, had they been before the patent examiner at
the United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO), would
have made this formulation obvious to one possessing ordinary
skill in the art at the time of the underlying patent application.' 6
Consequently, there is a good faith basis to believe that the patent
covering this drug is invalid. As such, you may lawfully seek
entry into the market prior to the expiration of the innovator
company's patent.
Accordingly, you counsel senior management that to gain FDA
approval as a bioequivalent generic version of the innovator's
drug, an abbreviated new drug application (ANDA) 17 containing a
"paragraph IV" certification is appropriate. 8 In your paragraph IV
certification, you certify that the patent covering the innovator
drug is invalid, will not be infringed by the manufacture, use, or
sale of the new drug for which the application is submitted, or is
unenforceable." 9
You are mindful your ANDA filing constitutes a statutory act of
infringement and you potentially face having to defend a patent
infringement lawsuit, which will often involve an allegation of
willful infringement, given your clear awareness of the Orange
Book patent.2" As an incentive, though, your company, as the first
generic ANDA-filer, stands to gain a 180-day exclusivity period as
16. See generally, KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 127 S. Ct. 1727 (2007)
(combination of familiar elements according to known methods is likely to be
obvious when it does no more than yield predictable results).
17. See 21 U.S.C. § 3550); see also 21 C.F.R. § 320.1(e) (1994) (defining

bioequivalence as "the absence of significant difference in the rate and extent to
which the active ingredient or active moiety in pharmaceutical equivalents or
pharmaceutical alternatives becomes available at the site of drug action when

administered at the same molar dose under similar conditions in an
appropriately designed study").

18. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(A)(vii)(IV); see also infra notes 159-61 and
accompanying text.
19. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii)(IV).
20. Id. § 271(e)(2)(A).
Published by Via Sapientiae, 2016
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the only FDA-approved generic, which could lead to substantial
financial successes outweighing the costs of the patent
infringement defense.21
After you file with the FDA, you notify the innovator company
of your filing by and through a Notice Letter.2 The Notice Letter
must contain the detailed factual and legal basis for your claim of
invalidity, non-infringement, or unenforceability.23 The innovator
company has 45-days to file a patent infringement lawsuit based
upon the statutory act of infringement created by your ANDA
filing. 24 Doing so will result in a 30-month stay of the FDA's
approval of the ANDA, which will remain in effect until the suit is
completed or the expiration of the time prescribed.25
Alternatively, the 45 days can run, your ANDA is approved, and
your company launches its product. At some point thereafter, the
innovator company can nevertheless file a patent infringement
lawsuit, with damages potentially available given your company's
sales.
In either setting, the resulting lawsuit often includes allegations
that the generic company willfully infringed the patent-at-issue,
thereby forcing the generic to defend against those allegations,
exposing the company to treble damages up to three times the
amount of actual damages, allowing discovery on the related
issues, and laying the groundwork for a potential claim of an
exceptional case for purposes of securing an award of attorney
fees.
Although rarely successful, pleading willful infringement often
provided a strategic benefit because it forced a generic company to
disclose the opinions on which it relied with regard to the validity,
infringement, or enforceability of the brand-name company's
patent. And, discovery was appropriate into these areas, involving
not only document requests and interrogatories, but also
depositions of counsel, and potential disqualification of law firms.

21. See id. §§ 355(j)(5)(B)(iv), (5)(D). These provisions govern the 180-day

exclusivity period given to the first company to file an abbreviated new drug
application with a paragraph IV certification.
22. See id. § 355(j)(2)(B).

23. See id.
24. Id.
25. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii).
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol18/iss2/2
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In addition to "raising the bar" and making it more challenging
to successfully plead and prove willfulness, the decision in
Seagate heightens the importance of the notice letter a generic
company issues to an innovator company as part of an ANDA
filing. Among other requirements, this notice must include "a
detailed statement of the factual and legal basis of the applicant's
opinion that the patent is not valid, unenforceable, or will not be
infringed."26 The FDA regulations also require, for a patent
alleged not to be infringed, an explanation of the theory of noninfringement.27 Where the claim is that the patent is invalid or
unenforceable, the regulation requires a full and detailed
explanation of that assertion.28
By providing the innovator company with this detailed factual
and legal basis of the generic applicant's opinion, it appears that in
light of Seagate's higher standard, the generic company is wellpositioned to demonstrate the absence of "objective recklessness."
Indeed, the very ANDA approval process itself is mindful of the
innovator's presumptively valid patent rights, and requires a
generic company to evaluate the innovator's patent and certify a
lack of infringement or invalidity, such that following those
procedures ineluctably shows methodical consideration rather than
"objective recklessness."
Consequently, brand-name plaintiffs may be precluded from
alleging willful infringement in their complaints due to the direct
evidence in the form of a detailed factual and legal basis in the
ANDA notice letter, already produced to the innovator prior to
litigation, showing the absence of objective recklessness. This
preclusion is, in fact, the result of a process designed to respect the
presumptive rights of an innovator company's patent(s).
Before considering the Federal Circuit's willfulness case law, a
brief introduction to fundamental patent law principles may be
helpful to provide a basis to place Seagate and its application to
generic and innovator pharmaceutical companies.

26. 21 C.F.R. § 314.95(c) (2003). The quoted language tracks the statute,
with the potentially important exception that FDA has added the word

"unenforceable."

27. Id. § 314.95(c)(6)(i).
28. Id. § 314.95(c)(6)(ii).
Published by Via Sapientiae, 2016
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III. GENERAL PATENT LAW PRINCIPLES: BACKGROUND FOR
SEAGATE AND ANDA LITIGATION
Article I, Section 8, clause 8 of the United States Constitution
vested power in Congress "to promote the Progress of Science and
useful Arts by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors
the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries."
Congress has from time to time used this power to enact various
iterations of the patent statute, and today, the statute is found at
Title 35 of the United States Code. By its terms, a patent confers
the right to exclude others from making, using, selling, offering for
sale, or importing into the United States the patented invention. 9
These rights become relevant when an individual engages in one
of the five enumerated activities. Regardless of their intent, parties
who engage in those acts without the permission of the patentee
during the term of the patent can be liable for infringement.
The patentee may file a civil suit in federal court in order to
enjoin infringers and obtain monetary remedies under federal
question jurisdiction.3" Although issued patents are presumed
valid, accused infringers may, by clear and convincing evidence,
show that the patent is invalid or unenforceable on a number of
grounds.3 ' It is said in patent law that the claims define the
invention; a patent claim is a single sentence definition of the exact
scope of the intangible property right asserted by the inventor.32
The rights United States patents provide are effective only in the
United States.

33

Literal patent infringement occurs if the accused composition or
method includes every element exactly as recited in at least one of
its claims.34 Under this standard of absolute identity, if an accused
product or process includes fewer elements or steps than were
recited in the claims, there is no literal infringement. In some

29. 35 U.S.C. § 27 1(a) (2006).
30. Id. § 281; 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2006).
31. 35 U.S.C. § 282.
32. Id. § 112.

33. Dowagiac Mfg. Co. v. Minn. Moline Plow Co., 235 U.S. 641, 650
(1915).
34. John R. Allison & Mark A. Lemley, The (Unnoticed) Demise of the
Doctrine of Equivalents, 59 STAN. L. REv. 955, 958-59 (2007).
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol18/iss2/2
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instances, the scope of protection associated with a patent may be
expanded beyond the literal wording of the claims under the
doctrine of equivalents.35 Under the doctrine of equivalents, an
accused product that presents insubstantial differences from the
claimed invention will be judged an equivalent and therefore an
infringement.36
The Patent Act sets forth the remedies a patentee may obtain
upon a finding of infringement.
These remedies include
injunctions,37 monetary damages,38 and attorney fees.39 The statute
also allows for damages to be increased by up to three times the
amount found.4"
Section 283 of the Patent Act allows courts to "grant injunctions
in accordance with the principles of equity to prevent the violation
of any right secured by patent, on such terms as the court deems
reasonable."
The Patent Act also provides for the award of
damages "adequate to compensate for the infringement, but in no
event less than a reasonable royalty for the use made of the
invention by the infringer."4"
However, monetary recovery is limited to events occurring
within six years prior to the filing of the complaint or counter
claim for patent infringement.4 2 Damages can take the form of lost
profits if the patentee can reasonably show that "but for" the
infringement, he would have made the sales made by the
infringer.43 To do so, a patentee must normally show that (1) the
patented product was in demand; (2) no acceptable noninfringing
substitute was available; (3) the patentee or its licensees possessed
the manufacturing and marketing capability to exploit the demand;
and (4) the amount of profit the patentee would have made.44
35. John M. Benassi et al., Claim Construction and Proving Infringement:
Impact of Phillips and Festo and Their Progeny, 910 PLI/PAT 57, 91 (2007).
36. Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 40
(1997).
37. 35 U.S.C. § 283.
38. Id. § 284.
39. Id. § 285.
40. Id. § 284.
41. Id.
42. Id. § 286.
43. See Kearns v. Chrysler Corp., 32 F.3d 1541, 1551 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
44. Panduit Corp. v. Stahlin Bros. Fibre Works, 575 F.2d 1152, 1158-59 (6th
Published by Via Sapientiae, 2016
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The statute also provides that the award of damages to a
prevailing patentee shall be no less than a reasonable royalty. 45 To
determine this amount, the court engages in a legal fiction of a
hypothetical licensing negotiation.46
Section 287(a) of the Patent Act provides that patentees should
affix the word "patent" or the abbreviation "pat." on the productin-issue, along with the number of the patent. If the patentee fails
to mark in the specified manner, however, then damages can be
limited only for acts occurring after the infringer receives actual
notice of the infringement.47
The Patent Act vests the trial court with the discretion to triple
damages. Whether damages are determined by the court or the
jury, "the court may increase the damages up to three times the
amount found or assessed.

' 48

Furthermore, "[b]ecause patent

infringement is a strict liability offense, the nature of the offense is
in determining whether enhanced damages are
only relevant
49
warranted.

And, the Patent Act provides that "the court in exceptional cases
may award reasonable attorney fees to the prevailing party."5
Where the prevailing party is the patent owner, the circumstances
that make a case exceptional for the award of attorney fees
generally align with those that would justify increased damages,
namely, willful infringement."

Cir. 1978).
45. 35 U.S.C. § 284.
46. Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. United States Plywood Corp., 318 F. Supp
1116, 1131-32 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
47. See Devices for Medicine, Inc. v. Boehl, 822 F.2d 1062 (Fed. Cir. 1987).
48. 35 U.S.C. § 284.
49. In re Seagate Tech., LLC, 497 F.3d 1360, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
50. 35 U.S.C. § 285.
51. Amsted Indus. Inc. v. Buckeye Steel Castings Co., 23 F.3d 374, 377
(Fed. Cir. 1994).
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol18/iss2/2
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WILLFUL INFRINGEMENT-FEDERAL CIRCUIT'S
JURISPRUDENCE

A. The Totality of the Circumstances
A finding of willfulness requires the fact finder to find by clear
and convincing evidence "that the infringer acted in disregard of
the patent."52 "Willful infringement" is not just a means to
enhance damages but also a statement that patent infringement,
akin to other civil wrongs, is disfavored; "an intentional disregard
of legal rights warrants deterrence.""
As the Federal Circuit has noted, the "[r]emedy for willful
infringement is founded on 35 U.S.C. § 284," which authorizes the
trial judge to increase the damages up to three times the amount
found or assessed, and 35 U.S.C. § 285, which empowers the trial
judge to declare a case "exceptional" and award reasonable
attorney fees to the prevailing party. 14 Indeed, the circumstances
that make a case exceptional for the award of attorney fees
generally align with those that would justify enhanced damages for
willful infringement."
Although the statute does not specifically set forth the basis
upon which damages may be enhanced, it is well-settled that
where infringement has been specifically found by clear and
convincing evidence to be "willful," the court is authorized, but
not required, to treble the damages.16 Absent a statutory guide, the
court has held that an award of enhanced damages requires a
57 and this standard accords with
showing of willful infringement,
5 8
Supreme Court precedent.
The determination of willfulness is made by assessing the
52. Stickle v. Heublein, Inc., 716 F.2d 1550, 1565 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
53. Knorr-Bremse Systeme Fuer Nutzfahreuge GmbH v. Dana Corp., 383
F.3d 1337, 1342 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
54. Id.
55. Amsted, 23 F.3d at 376.
56. Id.
57. See Jurgens v. CBK, Ltd., 80 F.3d 1566, 1570 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
58. See Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co., 377 U.S. 476,
508 (1964) (enhanced damages were available for willful or bad faith
infringement).
Published by Via Sapientiae, 2016
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totality of the circumstances.59
"Fundamental to the determination of willful infringement is the
duty to act in accordance with law. ' 6° In Read Corp. v. Portec,
Inc., the Federal. Circuit explained that the most important
consideration in willful infringement cases is the egregiousness of
the defendant's conduct based on all the facts and circumstances.61
At trial, there must be a finding of actual infringement, and then a
separate finding by the fact finder of whether the defendant's
infringement was willful. 62 In reaching its decision, the fact finder
must consider the totality of circumstances, which includes the
following factors:
(1) whether the infringer deliberately copies the
ideas or design of another; (2) whether the
infringer, when he knew of the other's patent
protection, investigated the scope of the patent and
formed a good faith belief that it was invalid or that
it was not infringed; (3) the infringer's behavior as
a party to the litigation; (4) defendant's size and
financial condition; (5) closeness of the case; (6)
duration of defendant's misconduct; (7) remedial
action by the defendant; (8) defendant's motivation
for harm; and (9) whether the defendant attempted
to conceal its misconduct. 63
"'Willfulness' in infringement, as in life, is not an all-or-nothing
trait, but one of degree. It recognizes that infringement may range
from unknowing, or accidental, to deliberate, or reckless, disregard
of a patentee's legal rights."'
A finding of willfulness does not
it merely permits it. 65
damages,
enhanced
of
award
an
require
59. Rolls-Royce Ltd. v. GTE Valeron Corp., 800 F.2d 1101, 1110 (Fed. Cir.
1986).
60. Knorr-Bremse Systeme Fuer Nutzfahreuge GmbH v. Dana Corp., 383
F.3d 1337, 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
61. Read Corp. v. Portec, Inc., 970 F.2d 816, 826 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
62. Liquid Dynamics Corp. v. Vaughan Co., 449 F.3d 1209, 1225 (Fed. Cir.
2006).
63. Id.
64. Rite-Hite Corp. v. Kelley Co., 819 F.2d 1120, 1125-26 (Fed. Cir. 1987).
65. Odetics, Inc. v. Storage Tech. Corp., 185 F.3d 1259 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol18/iss2/2
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In Underwater Devices, Inc. v. Morrison-Knudsen Company,
Inc., the Federal Circuit may have been mindful of these principles
and the mandate behind the court's very creation, which is to
remedy the widespread disregard of patent rights that undermines
the national innovation incentive.66
B. UnderwaterDevices - "Due Care" to Obtain an Opinion of
Counsel
In Underwater Devices, the patentee alleged willful
infringement. The accused infringer defended by contending that
it proceeded with the infringing activity in good faith based on
reliance of its counsel. 67 Reviewing the district court's finding of
willful infringement under the clearly erroneous standard, the
Federal Circuit affirmed not only the finding, but also the trebling
of the damages to the maximum authorized, as well as the award
of attorney fees. 68

The court reasoned, "where, as here, a potential infringer has
actual notice of another's patent rights, he has an affirmative duty
to exercise due care to determine whether or not he is
infringing. ' 69
The court further reasoned that "[s]uch an
affirmative duty includes, inter alia, the duty to seek and obtain
competent legal advice from counsel before the initiation of any
possible infringing activity."7
The accused infringer, who had actual notice of the patents-atissue, did not evaluate the validity or infringement of the patents
before beginning infringing activities. 7 The accused infringer
ordered the file histories "well after the infringement had begun,"
and did not receive the opinion of its patent counsel until long after
infringement had begun and after the complaint was filed.72
And, the court flatly rejected the quality of counsel's patent
66. ADVISORY

COMMITTEE ON INDUSTRIAL INNOVATION FINAL REPORT,

DEP'T OF COMMERCE (1979).

67.
1380,
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.

Underwater Devices, Inc. v. Morrison-Knudsen Company, Inc., 717 F.2d
1389 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
Id.
Id. at 1390.
Id. (emphasis in original).
Id.
Id.
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opinions, consisting of several memoranda. Concerning the first
memorandum, the court noted that "it was not legal advice upon
which the appellate was justified in relying, since it was not based
on an evaluation of the validity or infringement of the [patents]." 73
Indeed, the court went so far in denouncing counsel's opinions that
the court ultimately concluded the opinions demonstrated
willfulness rather than good faith:
It contains only bald, conclusory and unsupported
remarks regarding validity and infringement of the
[] patents. Had it contained within its four comers a
patent validity analysis, properly and explicitly
predicated on a review of the file histories of the
patents at issue, and an infringement analysis that,
inter alia, compared and contrasted the potentially
infringing method or apparatus with the patented
inventions, the opinion may have contained
sufficient internal indicia of creditability to remove
any doubt that [accused infringer] received a
competent opinion. What these memoranda clearly
demonstrated was [accused infringer's] willful
disregard for the [] patents.74
In further underscoring a patent's presumption of validity, the
court quoted the accused infringer's counsel in the opinion, who,
advised his client to "continue to refuse to even discuss the
payment of a royalty."75 The attorney also advised that "[c]ourts,
in recent years, have in patent infringement cases found the patents
claimed to be infringed upon invalid in approximately 80% of the
cases," and that for this reason, the patentee would not risk filing
suit.76

Given these bad facts, the Federal Circuit was ostensibly
reasonable and justified in sending a strong message to patent
counsel and potential infringers alike to respect patent rights.
Some may say that the Federal Circuit would have been remiss, on
73.
74.
75.
76.

UnderwaterDevices, 717 F.2d at 1390.
Id.
Id. at 1385.
Id.
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these facts, if it neglected to hold that an accused infringer's duty
of "due care," when having actual knowledge it may be infringing
a particular patent, included "the duty to seek and obtain
competent legal advice from counsel before the initiation of any
possible infringing activity." 7
Noteworthy is that the Federal Circuit was created to unify the
patent law by using one focused tribunal at a time "when
widespread disregard of patent rights was undermining the
national innovation incentive."" This mandate, coupled with the
cavalier conduct of the accused infringer's counsel in Underwater
Devices, prompted the Federal Circuit to create the "due care"
standard to further buttress the presumptive validity of patents to
deter potential infringers. All benevolent intentions aside, the
implementation of Underwater Devices spawned unanticipated
satellite litigation over the scope of privilege waiver stemming
from disclosure of the accused patent counsel's written opinion.
Therein lies a Hobson's choice.
C. To Disclose or Not in Light of UnderwaterDevices?
Under the Patent Act, a plaintiff may recover only actual
damages accruing from the patent's issuance date. 9 On the one
hand, willfulness focuses on the time when the infringer possessed
knowledge of the patent and facts sufficient to establish an
objectively high likelihood of infringement. On the other hand,
actual damages focus on the conduct of the plaintiff, i.e., when the
plaintiff gave the defendant notice of the patent and its potential
infringement. Thus, the Patent Act encourages patentees to place
others on notice of infringement.
In light of UnderwaterDevices, the practice evolved along these
lines: accused infringer receives a cease and desist letter from
patentee; accused infringer either already had secured
77. Id. at 1389-90.
78. ADVISORY COMMITTEE

ON INDUSTRIAL INNOVATION FINAL REPORT,

DEP'T OF COMMERCE (1979).
79. There is an exception here: provisional rights under 35 U.S.C. §§ 122,
154(d)(1)(B), which provide ability to pursue damages corresponding to a
reasonable royalty for infringement occurring subsequent to publication of the
application and prior to issuance of a patent from the application.
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infringement/validity opinion or promptly obtains such an opinion
concerning infringement, validity, or the unenforceability of the
patent-in-issue; the patent owner files suit, claiming willful
infringement; the accused infringer asserts its good faith reliance
on advice of counsel as a defense to willfulness, and produces the
opinion, thereby waiving applicable privilege.8"
Generally, this legal opinion letter is protected from disclosure
by the attorney-client privilege and the attorney work product
doctrine. 8'
An attorney's opinion letter regarding a patent's
validity, enforceability, or infringement normally embodies
communications and "the attorney's mental impressions and
beliefs, and reflects the attorney's opinion which is based on legal
analysis and reasoning and involved the exercise of legal skills."82
Intentional waiver of the attorney client privilege occurs, as is
often the case, where a party purposefully reveals protected
information to those beyond the scope of the privilege.
The issue of privilege arose three years after Underwater
Devices, in Kloster Speedsteel, AB v. Crucible Inc.83 There, the
Federal Circuit observed that the infringer "has not even asserted
that it sought advice of counsel when notified of the allowed
claims and [the patentee's] warning, or at any time before it began
this litigation," and held that the infringer's "silence on the subject,
in alleged reliance on the attorney-client privilege, would warrant
the conclusion that it either obtained no advice or counsel or did
so and was advised that its importation and sale of the accused
products would be an infringement of valid U.S. patents."84
Based upon the holdings and rationales in Underwater Devices
and Kloster Speedsteel, the court in Fromson v. Western Litho
Plate & Supply Co. 5 expanded upon the Kloster court's
suggestion of the propriety of an "adverse inference." Confirming
80. Roderick R. McKelvie et al., Nine Unanswered Questions After In re
Seagate Technology, Inc., 20 No. 4 INTELL. PROP. & TECH. L.J. 14 (2008); see

also F.R.E. 501.
81. Am. Standard, Inc. v. Pfizer, Inc., 828 F.2d 734, 744 (Fed. Cir. 1987).
82. Stix Prods. v. United Merchs. & Mfrs., 47 F.R.D. 334, 337 (S.D.N.Y.
1969).
83. Kloster Speedsteel AB v. Crucible Inc., 793 F.2d 1565 (Fed. Cir. 1986)

84. Id. at 1580.
85. Fromson v. W. Litho Plate & Supply Co., 853 F.2d 1568 (Fed. Cir.
1988).
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that suggestion overtly, the Federal Circuit in Fromson established
the general rule that "a court must be free to infer that either no
opinion was obtained or, if an opinion were obtained, it was
contrary to the infringer's desire to initiate or continue its use of
the patentee's invention."86
Thus, as of 1988, the Federal Circuit continued to emphasize
patent rights, and, in so doing, continued to set the stage for
widespread waiver issues to be resolved by the district courts.
This was so inasmuch as counsel and accused infringer had no
meaningful alternative but to seek out and secure a patent opinion,
voluntarily disclose it, and encounter the uncertainties related to
the scope of privilege waiver. Or, counsel and the accused
infringer could maintain the privilege only to endure an adverse
inference, the possibility of trebled damages, and an award of
attorney's fees.
The Federal Circuit recognized the proverbial rock and hard
place the accused infringer found itself: an adverse inference to be
drawn because its invocation of privilege or failure to seek a
detailed opinion of patent counsel in the first instance. Thus, the
Federal Circuit recognized that this issue was ripe for
consideration when it conducted an en banc review of cross
appeals taken in Knorr-Bremse Systeme Fuer Nutzfahrzeuge
GmbH v. Dana.
D. The End of the Adverse Inference, but Waiver Remains Vexing
At trial in Knorr-Bremse, the accused infringers informed the
court that it had consulted counsel concerning the patents at issue,
but declined to produce any legal opinion or to disclose the
evidence received, asserting the attorney-client privilege.
Applying Federal Circuit precedent, the district judge found that
"it is reasonable to conclude that such opinions were unfavorable."
The accused infringers were found liable for infringement and for
willful infringement concerning air brakes." No damages were
awarded as no commercial sales had yet occurred. However,
based on the finding of willful infringement, the court found that
86. Id. at 1572-73.
87. Knorr-Bremse Systeme Fuer Nutzfahreuge GmbH v. Dana Corp., 383
F.3d 1337, 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
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the case was "exceptional" and awarded the patentee partial
attorney fees.88
The accused infringer sought reversal of the finding of willful
infringement, and argued that an adverse inference should not have
been drawn from the withholding of an opinion of counsel
concerning the patent issues.89 After briefing and oral argument,
the court took the case en banc to reconsider its precedent with
respect to these aspects.9" The court issued four questions and
invited amicus curiae.91
Stating that "precedent to the contrary is overruled," the Federal
Circuit held that "no adverse inference that an opinion of counsel
was or would have been unfavorable flows from an alleged
infringer's failure to obtain or produce an exculpatory opinion of
counsel."92 Thus, the court's holding makes two points: there can
be no adverse inference for declining to seek the opinion of
counsel, and there can be no adverse inference from declining to
disclose an opinion of counsel.
In its reasoning, the Federal Circuit referred to case law holding
it improper to impose adverse inferences on invocation of the
attorney-client privilege.93 Perhaps of equal import, the Federal
Circuit also recognized that "the issue has occasioned extensive
satellite litigation, distorting the 'conceptual underpinnings' of
UnderwaterDevices and Kloster Speedsteel."9 4
Those conceptual underpinnings focused on protecting patent
rights and discouraging disregard 'for the law, but did not
contemplate the extensive collateral issues involved in patent
counsel's opinion, the quality of the opinion, the timeliness of the
opinion, how the opinion was communicated, the extent of the
infringer's reliance upon the opinion, waiver, the questions
involved where more than one opinion existed, the scope of
wavier, or the impact of the attorney work product doctrine.

88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Knorr-Bremse Systeme Fuer Nutzfahreuge GmbH v. Dana Corp., 344
F.3d 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (en banc order).
92. Knorr-Bremse, 383 F.3d at 1341.
93. Id. at 1345.
94. Id.
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In light of the Federal Circuit's en banc review and
consideration of the extensive amicus curiae, the court took
affirmative steps to decrease the burden upon an accused infringer
and respect the attorney-client privilege, thereby aligning the
patent law in this area with broader civil law while simultaneously
recognizing the presumptive validity of a patentee's rights. And,
significantly, in the wake of Knorr-Bremse, an accused infringer
with knowledge of another's patent still had a duty of "due care"
concerning another's patent. In practice, to discharge that duty,
accused infringers continued with regularity to seek and secure
opinions from patent counsel and disclose those opinions in
defending against willful infringement allegations, even though no
adverse inference would be imposed for declining to do so.
Although the significance of the content of patent counsel's
opinion was lessened in Knorr-Bremse, the dilemma of the broad
scope of attorney-client and attorney work product waiver
remained largely disjointed across the various circuits, leaving
litigants with uncertainty and a dire need for a talisman to navigate
the various rules across the various districts.
E. EchoStar-Canthe Accused Infringer Withhold Anything?
Two years after Knorr-Bremse, EchoStar presented the Federal
Circuit with the question of the extent to which a party waives its
attorney client privilege and work product immunity when it
asserts the advice of counsel defense in response to a claim of
willful patent infringement.
The Federal Circuit in In re EchoStar held that the disclosure of
any opinion waived privilege and work product as to all opinions
given, whether before or after the complaint was filed and whether
given by in-house or retained counsel.95 Thus, only work product
which was not communicated to the client remained protected
from disclosure when an accused infringer relied on counsel's
opinion to defend against willfulness.96
TiVo sued Echostar for infringement and in response to the
allegation of willful infringement, Echostar defended by relying on

95. In re EchoStar, 448 F.3d 1294 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (en banc).
96. Id. at 1297.
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the opinion of in-house counsel.9 7 After the lawsuit was filed,
Echostar sought out and secured an additional opinion on the
patent at issue, but chose not to rely on it.98 TiVo sought the
production of all communications concerning both opinions, which
the district court granted, allowing for redactions of information
unrelated to infringement or information related to trial
preparation."
The district court held that "by relying on advice of in-house
counsel EchoStar waived its attorney client privilege and attorney
work product immunity relating to advice of any counsel regarding
infringement," including retained counsel.' 0 With regard to the
scope of the waiver, the district court determined that the waiver
"included communications made either before or after the filing of
the complaint and any work product, whether or not the product
was communicated to EchoStar." 101
Upon clarifying its order, the district court stated that the wavier
of immunity extended to all work product of retained counsel
whether or not communicated to EchoStar, reasoning that the
documents sought could be relevant or lead to the discovery of
admissible evidence because they might contain information that
was conveyed to EchoStar, "even if the documents were not
themselves conveyed to EchoStar."° 2
In response, EchoStar petitioned the Federal Circuit for a writ of
mandamus, which was granted, and the court sat en banc. The
court began its analysis of the attorney-client privilege waiver by
noting "[t]he widely applied standard for determining the scope of
a waiver of attorney-client privilege is that the waiver applies to all
other communications relating to the same subject matter."10 3
Applying this rule to the case sub judice, the court concluded,
"[tihus, when EchoStar chose to rely on the advice of in-house
counsel, it waived the attorney-client privilege with regard to any

97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. EchoStar, 448 F.3d at 1297.

102. Id.
103. Id. at 1299 (citing Fort James Corp., v. Solo Cup Co., 412 F.3d 1340,

1349 (Fed. Cir. 2005)).
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attorney-client communications relating to the same subject
matter, including communications with counsel other than inhouse counsel, which
would include communications with
04
[retained counsel]."1
Thus, by relying on in-house counsel's analysis, EchoStar also
waived its attorney client privilege concerning all communications
about the patent at issue to any counsel, including retained
counsel.
Furthermore, that waiver extended from in-house
counsel's communications prior to the lawsuit to counsel retained
after the lawsuit. EchoStar set an almost open-ended time frame
for communications relevant to the subject of the waiver.
As the court noted:
[O]nce EchoStar chose to introduce the opinion, it
opened to inspection all related advice sought and
developed
regarding
EchoStar's
potential
infringement .... Regardless of when the opinions
or materials were transcribed or communicated to
EchoStar, such information necessarily relates to
the opinion being offered by [in-house counsel] and
goes to show EchoStar's state of mind with respect
to willful infringement.'05
Clearly, having the two patent opinions, one from in-house and
the other from retained counsel, could lead to disastrous results.
However, Echostar's facts presented the Federal Circuit with the
opportunity to emphasize its view that waiver had to be broad to
prevent gamesmanship, unfair advantage, or using "the attorneyclient privilege as both a sword and a shield." As the court
observed, "[s]elective waiver of the privilege may lead to the
inequitable result that the waiving party could waive its privilege
for favorable advice while asserting its privilege on unfavorable
advice."' 06
Turning next to the question of work product waiver, the Federal
Circuit contrasted the protections found in the attorney client
privilege and the attorney work product doctrine. "Unlike the
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 1301.
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attomey-client privilege, which protects all communications
whether written or oral, work-product immunity protects
documents and tangible things, such as memorandums, letters, and
e-mails."' 7
Concerning waiver, the court noted that a waiver of work
product is not as broad as a waiver of attorney-client privilege and
extends only to factual or "non-opinion" work product concerning
the same subject matter as the disclosed work product. And, the
court emphasized that although the content of counsel's work
product opinion is relevant, the real significance is the accused
infringer's state of mind in light of counsel's opinion, bearing on
the question of willfulness:
Work product waiver extends only so far as to
inform the court of the infringer's state of mind.
Counsel's opinion is not important for its legal
correctness. It is important to the inquiry whether it
is 'thorough enough, as combined with other
factors, to instill a belief in the infringer that a court
might reasonably hold the patent is invalid, not
infringed, or unenforceable.' It is what the alleged
infringer knew or believed, and by contradistinction
not what other items counsel may have prepared but
did not communicate to the client that informs the
court of an infringer's willfulness.'08
Thus, EchoStar teaches that information unrelated to the
defendant's state of mind forms an outer limit to the reach of the
work product immunity waiver. An additional limit inherent in the
work product waiver concerns information that is not relayed to
the client. If counsel's work product is not communicated to the
client, the waiver does not apply, understandably, because it
provides little if any assistance to the court in determining whether
the defendant knew he was infringing.
In the wake of EchoStar, an alleged infringer advancing an
107. EchoStar, 448 F.3d at 1301 (citing Judicial Watch, Inc. v. Dep't of
Justice, 432 F.3d 366 (D.C. Cir. 2005)).

108. Id. (quoting Ortho Pharm. Corp. v. Smith, 959 F.2d 936, 944 (Fed. Cir.
1992)).
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advice of counsel defense had to be prepared to disclose otherwise
privileged communications and work product relating to the
contents of the opinion, including "letters, memorandum,
conversation, or the like between the attorney and his or her client,
[as well as] any documents referencing a communication between
attorney and client."' 9
A broad attorney client privilege waiver, coupled with a less
broad but nevertheless penetrating work product waiver, limited
only by work product not communicated to the accused infringer,
literally opened in-house, retained, opinion, and trial counsel's
otherwise protected files to the scrutiny and leverage of the
patentee. Because the breadth of that waiver was unknown, the
accused infringer had to take a risk of exposing additional
attorney-client privileged information in order to defend itself.
Intending to fix the wrongs of "widespread disregard of patent
rights," the jurisprudence beginning with UnderwaterDevices, and
evolving through Kloster Speedsteel, Knorr-Bremse, and EchoStar
created a framework prompted by laudable intentions, but wracked
with practical and costly challenges, which all but vitiated the
attorney-client privilege and work product doctrine.
This
framework embroiled parties in costly, discovery intensive
litigation before the claims were construed, which is the crux of
any patent litigation.
According to the case law, the burden was on the accused
infringer to demonstrate "due care," rather than on the patentee to
show at least the absence of due care. A trial court was authorized
under the case law to treble damages by applying a standard more
in keeping with negligence (due care) than punitive damages
(recklessness). Additionally, the accused infringer's trial counsel's
files, as opposed to opinion counsel's files, were available to the
patentee on some undetermined, case-by-case basis. The Federal
Circuit recognized that these issues required sweeping corrective
action, and Seagate provided the case to do so.

109. Id. at 1304.
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IN RE SEAGATE-UNDERWATER DEVICES Is SUNK

Willful PatentInfringement in the Southern District
of New York

In Seagate, Convolve and Massachusetts Institute of Technology
filed suit against Seagate Technology and Compaq Computers
alleging willful infringement of three patents, and subsequently
amended their complaint to add a fourth count based upon a patent
that issued after the initial complaint was filed." 0
Prior to the lawsuit, Seagate requested and received legal
opinions regarding the Convolve patents and pending
application-which found claims of the patents to be either invalid
or not infringed by Seagate's technology, and that at least one
patent was possibly unenforceable."' The opinions were prepared
and tendered by counsel who acted separately and independently
from Seagate's trial counsel." 2
As required by the district court's scheduling order, Seagate
gave notice of its intent to rely on the legal opinions asserting
invalidity and noninfringement and subsequently disclosed all if its
opinion counsel's work product in addition to making the opinion
Not satisfied, however,
counsel available for deposition." 3
Convolve moved to compel disclosure of communications and
work product of all of Seagate's attorneys, both in-house and trial
counsel, a position countenanced by the Federal Circuit's opinion
in EchoStar."'
Although the legal opinions were from counsel independent of
Seagate's trial counsel, the district court, relying on EchoStar,
ruled that the disclosure of the opinions waived the privilege for
all communications with any counsel concerning the subject
matter of the opinions and that this waiver extended from when
Seagate first learned of the patents and lasted until the alleged

110. In re Seagate Tech., LLC, 497 F.3d 1360, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
111. Id.
112. Id. ("There is no dispute that Seagate's opinion counsel operated
separately and independently of trial counsel at all times.").
113. Id.
114. Id.
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infringement ceased. 5
In other words, the court ruled that Seagate had broadly waived
its attorney-client privilege as to the patents at issue, the protection
of work product communicated to Seagate was waived, and the
waiver extended to any of Seagate's counsel involved in the
matter."'6 The district court did provide for in camera review of
information concerning trial counsel's litigation strategy, but
opined that "any advice from trial counsel that undermined the
reasonableness of relying on [opinion counsel's] opinions would
warrant disclosure."' 17
In light of the district court's discovery order, Convolve,
apparently recognizing the opportunity to gain an otherwise
unavailable strategic advantage, sought production of trial
counsel's opinions relating to infringement, invalidity, and
enforceability of the patents at issue. Convolve also noticed
depositions of Seagate's trial counsel." 8 Seagate moved to stay
the discovery order to seek certification of an interlocutory appeal,
which the district court denied.'
In response, Seagate petitioned for a writ of mandamus with the
Federal Circuit, seeking a stay of the district court's discovery
orders. 2 ° Not only did the Federal Circuit stay the district court's
discovery order, but the court also, sua sponte, initiated en banc
review and directed briefing on the following three questions:
1. Should a party's assertion of the advice of
counsel defense to a willful infringement extend
waiver of the attorney-client privilege to
communications with that party's trial counsel?
2. What is the effect of any such waiver on work
product immunity?
3. Given the impact of the statutory duty of care
standard announced in Underwater Devices, on the

issue of waiver of attorney-client privilege, should
115. Id. at 1366-67.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.

Seagate, 497 F.3d at 1367.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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this court reconsider the decision121in Underwater
Devices and the duty of care itself?
Interestingly, the Federal Circuit declined to consider those
portions of the district court's discovery orders which related to
Seagate's in-house counsel, noting in a footnote that "[t]he
questions presented for en bane review do not encompass this
issue." 122

B.

"Due Care" Becomes "Objective Recklessness"

Reviewing the district court's determination of the waiver of
privilege for an abuse of discretion, and, because willful
infringement and the scope of waiver accompanying the advice of
counsel defense involved substantive patent law, the Federal
Circuit applied its own jurisprudence in answering these questions,
beginning with the appropriate standard by which to assess
willfulness.
The court discussed the meaning of "willfulness" outside patent
law, beginning with the meaning of the word as employed in the
Copyright Act. 123 The court stated that for willful copyright
infringement, other circuits have employed a recklessness standard
in awarding enhanced damages. 124
The court then looked at how the Supreme Court addressed the
meaning of willfulness in other areas of civil liability, specifically
within the context of the Fair Credit Reporting Act. 125 Under that
statute, a consumer is awarded actual damages for negligent
violations of the law,1 26 but can also recover punitive damages for
willful violations. 127 In Safeco, the Supreme Court stated that
"willful" includes reckless behavior, 128 and "this definition
comports with the common law usage, 'which treated actions in

121.
122.
123.
124.

Id.
Seagate, 497 F.3d at 1367 n.2.
Id. at 1370.
Id.

125. See Safeco Ins. Co. of Am. v. Burr, 127 S. Ct. 2201 (2007).
126. 15 U.S.C. § 1681o(a) (2006).

127. Id. § 1681n(a)(2).
128. Safeco, 127 S. Ct. at 2209.
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reckless disregard of the law as willful violations."' 29
Having referred to the Supreme Court to identify definitions and
applications of "recklessness," the court turned to the duty of care
set forth in Underwater Devices and recognized that the standard
for willfulness is more akin to negligence than reckless behavior,
and, thus "fails to comport with the general understanding of
willfulness in the civil context."' 3 ° Furthermore, the court stated:
the duty of care announced in Underwater Devices
sets a lower threshold for willful infringement that
is more akin to negligence . . . [and that] standard
fails to comport with the general understanding of
willfulness in the civil context [citations omitted],
and it allows for punitive damages in a manner
inconsistent with Supreme Court precedent. ''
Characterizing willful infringement damages as a form of
punitive damages, the Federal Circuit concluded that awarding
enhanced damages for conduct that was merely negligent for
failure to satisfy an affirmative duty of care is not consistent with
the Supreme Court precedent regarding the award of punitive
damages. 32
'
The court then addressed the holding in Underwater Devices,
overruled it, and expressly required that "proof of willful
infringement permitting enhanced damages requires at least a
showing of objective recklessness."' 33 The court abandoned the
affirmative duty of due care to seek opinion of counsel, but cited
Electro Med. Sys., S.A. v. Cooper Life Scis, Inc., 34 F.3d 1048,
1056 (Fed. Cir. 1994), which held that possession of a favorable
legal opinion is not essential to avoid a finding of willful
34
infringement; it is only one important factor to be considered.

129. Seagate, 497 F.3d at 1371.
130. Id. (citing McLaughlin v. Richland Shoe Co., 486 U.S. 128, 133
(1988)).
131. Id. (citing Safeco, 127 S. Ct. at 2209)).
132. Id. (citing Safeco, 127 S. Ct. at 2209, 2213-15, 2216 n.20; Smith v.
Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 39-49 (1983)).
133. Id.
134. Id.
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So, the Federal Circuit replaced the lower "due care" with the
higher standard of "objective recklessness."
The court acknowledged that "reckless" is not a selfilluminating term and set forth two elements of proof.13 5 The court
explained that "to establish willful infringement, a patentee must
show by clear and convincing evidence that the infringer acted
despite an objectively high likelihood that its actions constituted
infringement of a valid patent."' 3 6
Second, the court noted that "if this threshold objective standard
is satisfied, the patentee must also demonstrate that this
objectively-defined risk (determined by the record developed in
the infringement proceeding) was either known or so obvious that
'
it should have been known to the accused infringer." 137
Because there had been no record on the willfulness issue in the
underlying district court case, the Federal Circuit did not apply the
new willfulness standard, but instead, "left it to future cases to
further develop."
Thus, the Federal Circuit effectively shifted the burden from
accused infringer to patentee: under the Underwater Devices
standard, the accused infringer had the burden of proving due care,
while under the new standard, the patentee must show that the
accused infringer knew or should have known he was acting
recklessly.
C. Injunctive Relief as a Measure Of "Objective Recklessness?"
The court also addressed the newly articulated standard for
obtaining injunctive relief, as set forth by the Supreme Court in the
eBay case. "'
The Federal Circuit stated that "in ordinary
circumstances, willfulness will depend on an infringer's
prelitigation conduct."' 3 9 The court further suggested that the
patentee's remedy for reckless conduct by the accused infringer
post-filing is a motion for a preliminary injunction."'

135. Seagate, 497 F.3d at 1371.

136. Id.
137. Id.
138. See eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388 (2006).
139. Seagate, 497 F.3d at 1374.
140. Id.
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The Federal Circuit inferred that a patentee who does not seek
an injunction, or does not receive one, may have an uphill battle in
proving that the accused infringer's conduct was reckless. By
tying the recklessness inquiry to the standard for obtaining a
preliminary injunction, the court suggested that a substantial
question of invalidity, noninfringement, or unenforceability may
likely be sufficient to avoid a finding of willfulness.
D. Privilege & Immunity Waivers-Echostaris Curtailed,
Somewhat
As previously discussed, EchoStar held that reliance on in-house
counsel's advice to refute a charge of willfulness triggers waiver
of the attorney-client privilege and work product protection for all
communications on the same subject matters, as well as any
documents memorializing attorney-client communications.' 4 ' The
court noted the lack of uniformity in the district courts: some
courts had held that the waiver extended to trial counsel while
others had held the exact opposite; some courts had found a middle
ground requiring disclosure of communications that are contrary to
the legal opinion. 142

The Federal Circuit held that, generally, a party disclosing a
legal opinion obtained from independent counsel does not waive
the attorney-client privilege or work-product doctrine with respect
to opinions of trial counsel.' 43 "As a general proposition . . .
asserting the advice of counsel defense and disclosing opinions of
counsel do not constitute waiver of the attorney-client privilege for
communications with trial counsel."144 The court underscored "the
significantly different functions of trial counsel and opinion
counsel," and that these functions "advise against extending the
waiver to trial counsel."'4 5 Also, the Federal Circuit noted that the
141. In re EchoStar, 448 F.3d 1294, 1299, 1302-03 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
142. Seagate, 497 F.3d at 1372.

143. Id. at 1373-74.
144. Id. at 1373.
145. Id. The court stated further that "defenses prepared [by litigation
counsel] for a trial are not equivalent to the competent legal opinion of
noninfringement or invalidity which qualify as 'due care' before undertaking
any potentially infringer activity. Id. Because of the fundamental difference
between these types of legal advice, this situation does not present the classic
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Supreme Court has146 long recognized the need to protect trial
counsel's thoughts.

Thus, the court's proclamation reconciles the lack of uniformity
among the various district court interpretations by supplying a
firmer rule that the reach of waiver does not extend to trial
counsel.
But, the court's opinion does allow for "unique
circumstances" where waiver may be found.' 47 This is not an
"absolute rule" and "courts remain free to exercise their discretion
in unique circumstances to extend waiver to trial counsel, such as
if a party or counsel engages in chicanery."
The Federal Circuit held that the same rule applied to work
product waiver, reasoning that, "as a general proposition, relying
on opinion counsel's work product does not waive work product
immunity with respect to trial counsel," absent "exceptional"
circumstances. 48 Such unique or exceptional circumstances may
be found when opinion counsel and trial counsel are collaborating
in such a way that their distinctive functions blur.
For example, the role of opinion counsel as an objective
resource is undermined when opinion counsel is advised by trial
counsel as to how to craft the opinion. Although trial counsel and
opinion counsel may work closely during various portions of the
litigation, if the references cited and the arguments made are
effectively chosen by trial counsel, an "exceptional" or "unique"
circumstance may be found. Similar problems may arise when inhouse counsel writes an opinion and participates in a collaborative
effort with trial counsel.
In sum, Seagate overruled the long-standing "due care"
requirement and announced the new two-part "objective
recklessness" test. The burden shifted from the accused infringer
to show "due care," to the patentee to show "objective
recklessness." Seeking injunctive relief may be a predicate, or at
least an indicator, of whether a case is appropriate for a finding of
'sword and shield' concerns typically mandating broad subject matter waiver.
Id.
Therefore, fairness counsels against disclosing trial counsel's
communications on an entire subject matter in response to an accused
infringer's reliance on opinion counsel's to refute a willfulness allegation." Id.
146. Id. (citing Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 510-11 (1947)).
147. Id. at 1374-75.
148. Seagate, 497 F.3d at 1375.
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willful infringement.
Significantly, Seagate fenced off trial
counsel concerning waiver. Procedurally speaking, the Federal
Circuit granted Seagate's petition for mandamus and directed the
district court to "reconsider its discovery orders in light of this
opinion."' 49
VI. GENERAL IMPLICATIONS OF SEAGATE

The Federal Circuit's opinion may effectively end the use of
standard language in pleadings to assert a charge of willful
infringement in nearly all patent infringement cases.
The
"objective recklessness" requirement makes it more difficult to
prove willful infringement and will likely mean that enhanced
damages will not be awarded as often. While an accused infringer
is not required to obtain a legal opinion to rebut willfulness, those
opinions will still aid and be an invaluable if not crucial tool in
defending a charge of willful infringement, particularly if the
opinion is obtained before an infringement suit is filed. The risk of
a broad waiver of attorney-client privilege after an accused
infringer decides to rely on a legal opinion has also been reduced,
further increasing the utility of legal opinions assessing validity,
infringement, and enforceability of issued patents.
On remand from the Federal Circuit, the District Court for the
Southern District of New York, applying the Federal Circuit's
holding and analysis regarding the attorney-client privilege, denied
Convolve's motion for further discovery of defendant's in-house
counsel's communications that were not disclosed to opinion
counsel. 5 ' However, the court did state that Convolve may, in the
future, make a specific showing that it was previously denied
access to prelitigation communication of in-house counsel
regarding the opinions. 5'
The district court put to rest Convolve's argument that the
"Federal Circuit's standard for willfulness retains an element of
intent because willful infringement can still be demonstrated by a

149. Id. at 1376.
150. Convolve, Inc. v. Compaq Computer Corp., No. 00 Civ. 5141, 2007
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 87286, at *14-15 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 26, 2007).
151. Id.
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showing of subjective bad faith."' 152 The district court reiterated
what the Federal Circuit clearly stated in Seagate-there is one
standard for willful infringement, with two distinct hurdles: the
first is to present clear and convincing evidence of an objectively
high risk that the conduct constituted infringement, and the second
is to show the defendant's knowledge or constructive knowledge
of the risk.'53
The district court clarified that with regard to discovery of inhouse counsel communications with opinion counsel (before
infringement or after a lawsuit was filed), it must first be
determined whose opinion the defendant relied on in its defensedid it rely on in-house counsel or outside counsel or both?
Secondly, post-litigation communications do not affect the
willfulness inquiry, which focuses on prelitigation conduct, and
consequently, there is "no basis for taking discovery of in-house
' 54
counsel's communications after the litigation was commenced."'
With respect to outside opinion counsel, non-disclosed work
product remained undiscoverable, although the District Court
noted that information known by outside counsel would likely be
conveyed to the plaintiffs through depositions of Seagate's
engineers. 155
VII. SEAGATE S IMPACT ON ANDA LITIGATION

Seagate may have a particular impact in the context of
The Hatchpharmaceutical litigation under Hatch-Waxman.
Waxman Act provides for FDA approval of generic drugs
according to a statutory and regulatory procedure that is much
faster and less expensive than the FDA-approval process that the
original or innovator drug company followed before introducing
its patented medication or method to the market.
As the Federal Circuit has noted, Hatch-Waxman attempts to
balance the interest of the generic-drug manufacturers and the
innovator companies whose pioneering drugs are subject to patent

152. Id. t *10-11. at
153. Id. (citing Seagate, 497 F.3d at 1371).
154. Id. at *13 (citing Seagate,497 F.3d at 1374).
155. Id. at* 14.
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protection.'56 A generic company enjoys a streamlined FDAapproval process for generic drugs while pioneer companies are
rewarded for enduring the protracted FDA-NDA approval process
by a patent term extension of up to five years of patent
exclusivity. 57
'
Normally, one who uses a product or method protected by an
existing patent is engaging in the use of the product and thus

infringes.

However, under Hatch-Waxman, generic companies

may begin developing their drugs notwithstanding the pioneer

company's patent protection.' 58
Generic companies do not have to submit to the rigorous,
expensive, and time-consuming drug safety and efficacy
evaluation process necessary for the FDA to approve a new drug.
The generic company need only file an ANDA that relies on the

safety and efficacy of a drug previously approved by the FDA
through the use of a NDA. 59
'
The Hatch-Waxman Act requires that the ANDA applicant file
proof of bioequivalence and a certification. 6 ° In filing an ANDA,
156. For example, the Federal Circuit noted in Teva PharmaceuticalsUSA,
Inc. v. Pfizer, Inc. that "Congress struck a balance between two competing
policy interests: (1) inducing pioneering research and development of new drugs
and (2) enabling competitors to bring low-cost, generic copies of those drugs to
market." Teva Pharms. USA, Inc. v. Pfizer, Inc., 395 F.3d 1324, 1327 (Fed.
Cir. 2005).
157. 42 U.S.C. § 201 (2006); 35 U.S.C. § 156(a) (2006); see also Eli Lilly &
Co. v. Medtronic, Inc., 496 U.S. 661, 670 (1990) (explaining the cited statutory
provisions).
158. 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) creates an exception to the law of infringement
when the use of the invention is "reasonably related" to regulatory approval.
159. However, the 180-day exclusivity reward only applies to applications
that contain a certification "described in subclause (IV) of paragraph 2(A)(vii)."
In other words, exclusivity only applies to applications filed under 21 U.S.C. §
355(j)(2)(A)(vii), the provision listing the requirements for an "abbreviated
application for a new drug." An application filed under Section 355(b)(2) is
legally distinct, although a similar certification is required. Filing an application
under Section 355(b)(2) does not give rise to an exclusivity period.
160. 21 U.S.C. § 3550) (2006); see also 21 C.F.R. § 320.1(e) (1994)
(defining bioequivalence as "the absence of significant difference in the rate and
extent to which the active ingredient or active moiety in pharmaceutical
equivalents or pharmaceutical alternatives becomes available at the site of drug
action when administered at the same molar dose under similar conditions in an
appropriately designed study").
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the applicant must make one of four certifications with regard to
each patent listed in the "Approved Drug Products with
Therapeutic Equivalence Evaluations," known as the "Orange
Book." The Orange Book is published by the FDA in furtherance
of the ANDA process for the generic company to review before
seeking approval to manufacture, use, sell, or offer for sale FDAapproved drugs protected by the NDA applicant's patent
protection.
Upon filing an ANDA, a generic company determines which
certification to make with regard to the pioneer company's patent,
including:
"(I) that such patent information has not been filed,
(II) that such patent has expired, (III) of the date on
which such patent will expire, or(IV) that such
patent is invalid or will not be infringed by the
manufacture, use, or sale of the new drug for which
the application is submitted."' 6
It is the final certification, the paragraph IV certification, that
constitutes a statutory act of infringement.162
After such
certification is made, the ANDA applicant must notify the patent
owner and NDA holder of the certification and of the basis of its
assertion that the patent is invalid or not infringed.'63 Notably,
while the basis of the opinion is given to opposing counsel via the
certification, the actual opinion is not usually disclosed. The
patent owner has 45 days to file a patent infringement lawsuit
against the ANDA filer to obtain a 30-month stay of the FDA's
approval of the ANDA. " All of this can and does occur even
though the ANDA applicant has not yet engaged in truly
commercial activities.
Once the brand-name company files its patent infringement suit,
it often alleges that the generic company willfully infringed. Prior
to the new standard announced in Seagate, the Federal Circuit held
in Glaxo Group Ltd. v. Apotex, Inc. that the "mere fact that a
161.
162.
163.
164.

21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii)(I)-(IV).
Id. § 271(e)(2)(A).
Id. § 355(j)(2)(B).
Id. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii).
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company has filed an ANDA application or certification cannot
support a finding of willful infringement for purposes of awarding
attorney's fees pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(4)."' 6 5 That is, the
"mere" filing of an ANDA does not, taken alone, constitute
grounds for finding willful infringement.16 6 Thus, it appears that
district courts may entertain willfulness allegations as long as the
allegation does not rest exclusively on the filing of an ANDA or
Paragraph IV certification.
The Glaxo holding suggests that filing an ANDA, in conjunction
with other activities, perhaps the other nine totality factors
discussed, 6 7 may conceptually give rise to willfulness. Also in
Glaxo, the ANDA application at issue was not filed pursuant to 21
U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A) and, as a result, did not include a paragraph

IV certification. 168
The Federal Circuit was also careful to point out what its
previous jurisprudence had held with regard to willful
infringement in the ANDA setting. Namely, the Federal Circuit
clarified its holding in the Yamanouchi Pharmaceutical Co. v.
Danbury Pharmacol,Inc. case, stating that "we did not agree that

165. Glaxo Group Ltd. v. Apotex, Inc., 376 F.3d 1339, 1350-51 (Fed. Cir.
2004).
166. Janssen, L.P. v. Barr Labs., Inc., No. 07-1515, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
7965, *10 n.1 (D.N.J., Feb. 4, 2008) ("The Court recognizes that, despite the
plaintiffs
clarity of the Federal Circuit's opinions in Glaxo [] and Yamanouchi [],
in Hatch-Waxman Act cases repeatedly allege willful infringement based only
on the filing of an ANDA and paragraph IV certification -- and district courts
are repeatedly flooded with motions such as the one presented here. Faced with
this recurring issue, the Court's Opinion now joins the litany of literature
attempting to inform plaintiffs that the mere filing of an ANDA cannot give rise
to a claim of willful infringement.") (citing Forest Labs., Inc. v. Ivax Pharms.,
Inc., No. 03-891-JJF, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS (D. Del., Mar. 15, 2007); Aventis
Pharma Deutschland GMBH v. Cbalt Pharm., Inc., 355 F. Supp. 2d 586 (D.
Mass. 2005)).
167. See supra notes 56-60 and accompanying text.
168. Glaxo, 376 F.3d at 1344 ("In the current case, however, CA was
approved under 21 U.S.C. § 357, a now-repealed provision of the Federal Food,
Drug, and Cosmetic Act relating to antibiotics. Drug manufacturers who utilized
Section 357 to obtain FDA approval are exempt from listing the patents related
to their antibiotic in the Orange Book. Correspondingly, ANDA applicants
attempting to market generics of such antibiotics are not required to file a
certification under 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A).").
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the generic company had engaged in willful infringement, but
rather determined that an award of attorney's fees was permitted
because the generic had filed numerous baseless filings supporting
its fruitless and meritless arguments, both in its case at trial and in
its ANDA certification. Such unjustified litigation and misconduct
'
has always justified a finding of an exceptional case."169
This clarification may need further elaboration because, while
the Federal Circuit stated in Yamanouchi that 35 U.S.C. §
271(e)(2) and (4) mean that filing of an ANDA is a basis for
attorney fees under § 285, regardless of whether there is a
commercial sale, 7 ' the Federal Circuit also stated that it "has
recognized many varieties of misconduct that make a case
exceptional for a fee award.
Those forms of misconduct include
' 171
willful infringement."
The Federal Circuit's stance on willful infringement in the
ANDA context seems to have flexibility, particularly because of
the language employed: the "mere" filing of the ANDA and
172
certification cannot constitute willful infringement.
That said, Seagate may place even more importance on the
notice letter. When a generic company files an ANDA with a
Paragraph IV certification, the generic is required to send the
patent owner and NDA holder a "notice letter." This notice must
include "a detailed statement of the factual and legal basis of the
applicant's opinion that the patent is not valid, unenforceable, or
will not be infringed."' 73 The FDA regulations also require, for a
patent alleged not to be infringed, an explanation of the theory of
169. Id. at 1350; see also Yamanouchi Pharms. Co., v. Danbury Pharmacal,
Inc., 231 F.3d 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
170. Yamanouchi, 231 F.3d at 1346 (citing 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(2), (4)).
171. Id. at 1346-47 (citing Avia Group Int'l., Inc. v. L.A. Gear Cal., Inc., 853
F.2d 1557, 1567 (Fed. Cir. 1988); Rosemont, Inc. v. Beckman Instruments, Inc.,
727 F.2d 1540, 1548 (Fed. Cir. 1984)).
172. Wyeth v. Ranbaxy Labs. Ltd., 448 F. Supp. 2d 607, 612 (D.N.J. 2006)
("Based on the holdings of Glaxo and Yamanouchi, it is clear that the Federal
Circuit has not foreclosed the possibility of an award of attorney fees under the
"exceptional case" rubric in ANDA litigation."). This is permitted under 35
U.S.C. § 271(e)(4) and 35 U.S.C. § 285.
173. 21 C.F.R: § 314.95(c) (2003). The quoted language tracks the statute,
with the potentially important exception that FDA has added the word
"unenforceable."
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non-infringement.' 74 Where the claim is that the patent is invalid
or unenforceable, the regulation requires a full and detailed
explanation of that assertion. 75
'
In light of Seagate's holding, the notice letter which, of
necessity, is sent prior to litigation, though after the technical act
of infringement of submitting the ANDA, could well be sufficient
to prove an absence of objective recklessness. And, in-house,
opinion, or trial counsel should carefully consider the extent of the
information contained in the notice letter, not only to satisfy the
regulatory obligations, but also to potentially obviate the need to
disclose the opinion of patent counsel. In other words, providing
sufficiently detailed information in the notice letter may be
sufficient to demonstrate the lack of objective recklessness,
without resort to disclosure and waiver when defending against a
willfulness allegation.
In any event, Seagate, when coupled with the statutory and
regulatory requirements of Hatch-Waxman, indicates that
innovator companies face an arduous challenge in surviving
attacks on their naked willfulness pleadings. As one noted expert
on generic pharmaceutical law stated:
For willfulness cases, the naked proposition of
willfulness should be supported by specific facts.
Courts should strike willfulness claims until such
time that the complaint can be amended with such
specific facts. Imposing a stricter pleading standard
will simplify the discovery, avoid battles of
attorney-client privilege, and move the case along
so that the case can be adjudicated well before the
30-month stay expires.
Discovery will be
simplified because there will be less documentation
tendered, less electronic discovery to sift through,
less depositions, less motion practice, etc.
Patentees asserting weak patents have every motive
to unduly propagate and delay the litigation. If the
defendant ultimately loses, then the issue of

174. Id. § 314.95(c)(6)(i).
175. Id. § 314.95(c)(6)(ii).
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willfulness ripens and can be re-pled. 71 6
Put simply, generic drug companies are mandated by the statutes
and regulations in Hatch-Waxman to follow specific, reasonable,
lawful steps in challenging innovator patents prior to expiration.
Methodically following those procedures, conceptually and in
practice, is at odds with "objectively reckless" behavior.
Consequently, the heightened standard for willfulness announced
in Seagate stands to eviscerate the motions practice and attendant
discovery normally associated with the advice of counsel defense.
And, for these reasons, Seagate provides the necessary
precedent for district courts to establish a firm rule that willfulness
allegations will be struck, sua sponte, with leave to amend should
discovery unearth sufficient evidence of willfulness.
VIII. CONCLUSION
While the reality of Seagate is perhaps still setting in, it is clear
that the decision, when considered against the backdrop of the
cases that came before it, has not only raised the bar to prove an
allegation of willful infringement, but also curtailed the scope of
privilege and immunity waivers. Within the Hatch-Waxman
regime, which requires generic pharmaceutical companies to
adhere to the established statutory and regulatory framework when
challenging the patent(s) of an innovative drug, proving
"objectively reckless" behavior is likely an insurmountable
hurdle-Seagate may end the flood of willful infringement
allegations in the ANDA setting.

176. Shashank Upadhye, Generic PharmaceuticalPatent and FDA Law 63132 (2008).
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